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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
The State charged thirty-five-year-old Lucas Francke with possession of a
controlled substance and possession of drug paraphernalia. Mr. Francke filed a motion
to suppress the drug and drug paraphernalia evidence, on the basis the statute used to
justify reasonable suspicion for Mr. Francke’s traffic stop was unconstitutionally vague
as applied. The district court denied the motion to suppress. Mr. Francke then agreed
to plead guilty to the charges under a conditional plea agreement reserving the right to
appeal the denial of his motion to suppress.

The district court imposed a unified

sentence of five years, with two years fixed, and retained jurisdiction.

On appeal,

Mr. Francke asserts the district court erred when it denied his motion to suppress.
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
At Mr. Francke’s motion to suppress hearing, the parties stipulated to the
following facts.

(See Tr., p.6, L.9 – p.9, L.9.)

Ada County Sheriff’s Office

Deputy Pickard had been on patrol, following a white pickup truck with a trailer ball hitch
through the bumper that blocked part of the license plate. (Tr., p.7, Ls.21-24; see
R., p.93.) Deputy Pickard initially had been unable to get an angle from which to read
the license plate because the road had traffic going each way, and he could not read
the entire license plate from directly behind the truck. (See Tr., p.8, Ls.7-15, p.8, L.25 –
p.9, L.2.) Once Deputy Pickard stopped the truck and left his vehicle, he was able to
ascertain the two letters “XR” on the license plate were blocked. (See Tr., p.7, L.24 –
p.8, L.3.) The truck was an older model with the license plate in a standard position,
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and the license plate was securely fastened. (Tr., p.8, Ls.16-21.) Mr. Francke was the
passenger in the truck. (See Tr., p.8, Ls.12-13.)
Beyond the stipulated facts, the presentence report stated Deputy Pickard
detected the odor of marijuana coming from the cab of the truck during his conversation
with the truck’s occupants. (See Presentence Report (hereinafter, PSI), p.3.) Deputy
Kindelberger responded to the scene with a K-9 unit. (PSI, p.3.) Before the K-9 was
deployed, the driver of the truck admitted to having a small amount of marijuana in the
truck. (PSI, p.3.) The deputies searched Mr. Francke, and found a total of 7.6 grams of
methamphetamine, two pipes, a digital scale, a mirror, razor blades, and $140.00, all in
a backpack near his person. (PSI, p.3.) Mr. Francke reportedly admitted to being in
possession of the backpack. (See PSI, p.3.) The deputies arrested Mr. Francke and
took him to the Ada County Jail. (See PSI, p.3.)
The State charged Mr. Francke by Information with one count of possession of a
controlled substance, felony, Idaho Code § 37-2732(c), and one count of possession of
drug paraphernalia, misdemeanor, I.C. § 37-2734A.

(R., pp.57-58.)

Mr. Francke

entered a not guilty plea. (R., p.76.)
Mr. Francke filed a Motion to Suppress, requesting “an Order suppressing the
drugs and drug paraphernalia that was seized following the unlawful stop of Defendant’s
vehicle . . . obtained by law enforcement in violation of the Fourth Amendment of the
United States Constitution and Article I, Section 17 of the Idaho State Constitution.”
(R., pp.90-92.) Mr. Francke also filed a Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion to
Suppress. (R., pp.93-99.) In the memorandum, he asserted the State would rely upon
I.C. § 49-428(2) to argue the truck was in violation of Idaho law, which gave
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Deputy Pickard reasonable suspicion to initiate the traffic stop.

(See R., p.95.)

I.C. § 49-428(2) provides:
Every license plate shall at all times be securely fastened to the vehicle to
which it is assigned to prevent the plate from swinging, be at a height not
less than twelve (12) inches from the ground, measuring from the bottom
of the plate, be in a place and position to be clearly visible, and shall be
maintained free from foreign materials and in a condition to be clearly
legible, and all registration stickers shall be securely attached to the
license plates and shall be displayed as provided in section 49-443(4),
Idaho Code.
Mr. Francke asserted “[t]he language ‘clearly visible’ and ‘maintained free from foreign
materials’ in I.C. § 49-428(2) is unconstitutionally vague as applied to Defendant and
allowed [Deputy] Pickard to arbitrarily and discriminatorily enforce the requirement of
the statute against Defendant.” (R., p.95.)
Mr. Francke characterized the issue as “whether the language ‘clearly visible’
and ‘maintained free from foreign materials in in a condition to be clearly legible’” from
Section 49-428(2) “applies only to the license plate itself or also to other attachments to
the vehicle that are in front of the plate.” (R., p.95.) He asserted that language was
“unconstitutionally vague because a person of ordinary intelligence would not know
whether that applies to objects attached to the vehicle in front of the license plate, or if it
applies only to the plate itself.” (R., p.95.) Mr. Francke asserted “[t]he statute does not
define with sufficient clarity what is prohibited. For example, it does not state that the
plate must be in a place and position to be clearly visible to vehicles travelling directly
behind it.” (R., p.95 (emphasis in original).)
Mr. Francke further asserted “[t]he stop of the truck was unreasonable based
upon the unconstitutionality of I.C. § 49-428(2), and there was no other reason
articulated by Officer Pickard to justify the stop of the truck that Defendant was travelling
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in.” (R., p.96.) Thus, Mr. Francke asserted “all evidence obtained following the unlawful
investigative stop must be suppressed as fruit of the poisonous tree.” (R., p.96.)
The State filed a State’s Objection and Response to the Defendant’s Motion to
Suppress. (R., pp.103-115.) The State argued “Deputy Pickard had reasonable and
articulable suspicion to believe that the vehicle the defendant was traveling in was in
violation of Idaho Code 49-428(2).” (R., p.105.) Based on State v. Kinch, 159 Idaho 96,
100-01, 356 P.3d 389, 393-94 (Ct. App. 2015), where the Idaho Court of Appeals
clarified “that ‘clearly legible’ includes the ability to easily read the temporary permit from
another vehicle,” the State contended “the language ‘at all times’ and ‘clearly legible’
make it clear that the legislature intended the statute to require the license plate to be
easily readable from a vehicle behind the defendant’s vehicle.” (R., pp.105-06.) The
State argued, “[i]n this case, the vehicle in which the defendant was a passenger had a
foreign material, a trailer ball, covering a portion of the license plate preventing the
license plate from being easily readable.” (R., p.106.)
At the motion to suppress hearing, Mr. Francke repeated the assertion that
I.C. § 49-428 “is unconstitutionally vague.” (Tr., p.11, Ls.6-8.) Mr. Francke also asked
the district court to “find that the plain reading of this statute applies only to objects that
are directly on the plate and that—that the language ‘free from foreign materials’ applies
only to materials that are actually on the plate and not away from the plate such as the
trailer ball hitch.” (Tr., p.11, Ls.16-24.) Mr. Francke clarified the void for vagueness
challenge was as applied, not facial. (Tr., p.16, Ls.10-20.) The State submitted the
issue on the briefing. (Tr., p.19, Ls.5-6.)
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The district court then stated, “I think the statute is clear; to parse it more closely
is to ignore the admonition from our appellate courts that we are to read things in their
plain language.” (Tr., p.21, Ls.8-11.) The district court thought “clearly visible” had a
common meaning that could be understood, and the rationale for license plates was so
law enforcement and others could identify a vehicle when it was on the highway or on
the road. (Tr., p.21, Ls.11-18.) The district court did not think “that we can say that this
is an unconstitutionally vague statute.” (Tr., p.22, Ls.6-7.) According to the district
court, the language about keeping the license plate free from foreign materials was not
involved here; the district court would not consider “the trailer ball hitch to be foreign
material.” (See Tr., p.22, Ls.7-21.) Instead, the district court thought “the real issue
here is the obstruction of the plate by the ball itself.” (Tr., p.22, Ls.21-23.)
From a practical standpoint, the district court suggested one could either move
the license plate because the statute did not require the license plate to be in a
particular place, or remove the trailer hitch ball. (See Tr., p.22, L.24 – p.23, L.12.) The
district court stated, “[t]here is no record here . . . that the ball itself is welded. . . .
[T]railer hitch balls are removable.” (Tr., p.23, Ls.12-15.) The district court denied the
motion to suppress. (Tr., p.24, Ls.13-14.)
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Mr. Francke later agreed to plead guilty to the
charges. (Tr., p.30, L.7 – p.31, L.13.) The parties agreed to open recommendations at
sentencing. (Tr., p.31, Ls.1-3.) Mr. Francke reserved his right to appeal the district
court’s denial of his motion to suppress. (Tr., p.30, Ls.7-23, p.34, Ls.21-25; R., p.128.)
The district court accepted Mr. Francke’s guilty plea. (Tr., p.44, Ls.5-9.)
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At the sentencing hearing, the State recommended the district court impose a
unified sentence of seven years, with three years fixed, and retain jurisdiction.
(Tr., p.56, Ls.5-10.)

Mr. Francke’s defense counsel informed the district court

Mr. Francke was going to be sentenced on two felonies in Canyon County the week
after the sentencing hearing in this case. (Tr., p.57, L.18 – p.58, L8.) Mr. Francke
recommended the district court place him on probation. (Tr., p.57, Ls.18-20, p.59, Ls.47, p.63, L.19.)

For the possession of a controlled substance count, the district court

imposed a unified sentence of five years, with two years fixed, and retained jurisdiction.
(R., pp.156-60.) The district court deferred pronouncing sentence on the possession of
drug paraphernalia count “until the rider review hearing.” (See R., p.158.)
Mr. Francke filed a Notice of Appeal timely from the district court’s Judgment of
Conviction and Order Retaining Jurisdiction and Commitment.
R., pp.163-67 (Amended Notice of Appeal).)
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(R., pp.146-49; see

ISSUE
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Francke’s motion to suppress?
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Francke’s Motion To Suppress
A.

Introduction
Mr. Francke asserts the district court erred when it denied his motion

to suppress, because I.C. § 49-428(2) is void for vagueness. Because Section 49428(2), the statute used to justify reasonable suspicion for Mr. Francke’s traffic stop, is
unconstitutionally vague as applied to Mr. Francke’s conduct, there was no reasonable
and articulable suspicion that the truck he occupied was being driven contrary to traffic
laws. The traffic stop therefore violated Mr. Francke’s constitutional right to be free from
unreasonable searches and seizures. The district court should have suppressed the
drug and drug paraphernalia evidence found as a result of the traffic stop.
B.

Standard Of Review
“The standard of review of a district court’s denial of a motion to suppress is two-

fold. The appellate court will not overturn the trial court’s factual findings unless they
are clearly erroneous. However, the application of constitutional standards to the facts
found by the district court is given free review.”

State v. Wright, 134 Idaho 79,

81 (2000).
Similarly, the constitutionality of a statute is a question of law that is reviewed de
novo.

State v. Cobb, 132 Idaho 195, 197 (1998).

A party challenging the

constitutionality of a statute must overcome a strong presumption of validity. Id.
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C.

Idaho Code § 49-428(2) Is
Mr. Francke’s Conduct

Unconstitutionally Vague

As

Applied To

Mr. Francke asserts I.C. § 49-428(2) is unconstitutionally vague as applied to
his conduct. The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I,
Section 17 of the Idaho Constitution prohibit unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S.
Const. amend. IV.; Idaho Const. art. I, § 17. Evidence obtained in violation of this
constitutional right is generally inadmissible against the accused as the “fruit of the
poisonous tree.”

See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 487-88 (1963);

Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
A traffic stop by law enforcement constitutes a seizure of the vehicle’s occupants
and implicates the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable searches and
seizures. See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 650 & n.1, 653 (1979). A traffic stop
is akin to a limited investigative detention and analyzed under the principles set forth in
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). See Rodriguez v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, 135 S.
Ct. 1609, 1614 (2015). Determining whether an investigative detention is reasonable
involves a dual inquiry into whether the officer’s action was justified at its inception and
whether it was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that justified the
interference in the first place.

State v. Perez-Jungo, 156 Idaho 609, 614 (Ct.

App. 2014).
An investigative detention is permissible if it is based upon specific articulable
facts which justify reasonable suspicion that the detained person is, has been, or is
about to be engaged in criminal activity. Id. (citing Terry, 392 U.S. 1, 26; State v.
Sheldon, 139 Idaho 980, 983 (Ct. App. 2003)). Under the Fourth Amendment, an officer
may stop a vehicle to investigate possible criminal behavior if there is reasonable and

9

articulable suspicion that the vehicle is being driven contrary to traffic laws. See United
States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981); Prouse, 440 U.S. at 663.
Here, Mr. Francke asserts there was no reasonable and articulable suspicion that
the truck he occupied was being driven contrary to traffic laws, because I.C. § 49428(2), the statute used to justify reasonable suspicion for the traffic stop (see, e.g.,
R., p.105), is unconstitutionally vague as applied to his conduct.
The void for vagueness doctrine is rooted in the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.

Rogers v. Tennessee, 532 U.S. 451, 457 (2001).

This

“doctrine requires that a penal statute define the criminal offense with sufficient
definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a
manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.” Kolender v.
Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983) (citation omitted). “The more important aspect of the
vagueness doctrine ‘is not actual notice, but the other principal element of the doctrine –
the requirement that a legislature establish minimal guidelines to govern law
enforcement.’” Id. at 358 (quoting Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 574 (1974)).
“Where the legislature fails to provide such minimal guidelines, a criminal statute
may permit a ‘standardless sweep that allows policemen, prosecutors, and juries to
pursue their personal predilections.’”

Id.

(quoting Smith, 415 U.S. at 575).

“Legislatures may not so abdicate their responsibilities for setting the standards of the
criminal law.”

Smith, 415 U.S. at 575.

Rather, the “absence of any ascertainable

standard for inclusion or exclusion is precisely what offends the Due Process Clause.”
Id. at 578 (citation omitted). Simply put, a law is void for vagueness when it subjects a
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person “to criminal liability under a standard so indefinite that police, court, and jury [are]
free to react to nothing more than their own preferences . . . .” Id.
A statute may be challenged as unconstitutionally vague on its face or as applied
to a defendant’s conduct. State v. Korsen, 138 Idaho 706, 712 (2003), abrogated on
other grounds by Evans v. Michigan, ___ U.S. ___, 133 S. Ct. 1069 (2013). To succeed
in making an as applied challenge, a defendant “must show that he did not receive fair
notice from the statute and interpretive case law that his particular conduct was
punishable.” State v. Wees, 138 Idaho 119, 123 (2002) (citing Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S.
733, 755-57 (1974)).
In this case, Mr. Francke challenged I.C. § 49-428(2) as unconstitutionally vague
as applied. (See Tr., p.16, Ls.10-20.) Section 49-428(2) provides, in relevant part, that
every license plate shall “at all times . . . be in a place and position to be clearly visible,
and shall be maintained free from foreign materials and in a condition to be clearly
legible . . . .” I.C. § 49-428(2).
Mindful of the plain language of Section 49-428(2) and its mandate that every
license plate shall at all times be “clearly visible,” see Verska v. St. Alphonsus Reg’l
Med. Ctr., 151 Idaho 889 (2011), Mr. Francke asserts the statute is unconstitutionally
vague as applied to his conduct.

As Mr. Francke asserted during the suppression

hearing, “the plain reading of this statute applies only to objects that are directly on the
plate and that—that the language ‘free from foreign materials’ applies only to materials
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that are actually on the plate and not away from the plate such as the trailer ball hitch.”
(See Tr., p.11, Ls.16-24.)1
Thus, because Section 49-428(2), the statute used to justify reasonable
suspicion for Mr. Francke’s traffic stop, is unconstitutionally vague as applied, there was
no reasonable and articulable suspicion that the truck he occupied was being driven
contrary to traffic laws. See Cortez, 449 U.S. at 417; Prouse, 440 U.S. at 663. The
traffic stop therefore violated Mr. Francke’s constitutional right to be free from
unreasonable searches and seizures. See Cortez, 449 U.S. at 417. The district court
erred when it denied Mr. Francke’s motion to suppress. The district court should have
suppressed the drug and drug paraphernalia evidence found as a result of the
traffic stop. See Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 487-88; Mapp, 367 U.S. 643.

1

But see, e.g., English v. State, 191 So.3d 448, 451 (Fla. 2016) (holding “a tag light,
hanging down in front of a license plate, obscuring its alphanumeric designation,
constitutes a violation of [Florida’s statute on the display of license plates].”); Parks v.
State, 247 P.3d 857, 861 (Wyo. 2011) (“We agree with the majority of jurisdictions that
have considered the issue and determined that a trailer ball positioned so as to partially
obstruct a license plate constitutes a violation of the respective license plate
display statute.”)
12

CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, Mr. Francke respectfully requests this Court vacate his
judgment of conviction, reverse the district court’s order denying his motion to suppress,
and remand the case to the district court for further proceedings.
DATED this 24th day of October, 2016.

____/S/_____________________
BEN P. MCGREEVY
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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